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Elena Tripaldi, Università degli Studi di Padova 
 
“Is there anything to Hegel’s philosophy of history other than its 
‘historical’ interest?” (p.3). Terry Pinkard’s Does History Make 
Sense claims that there is. With this claim Pinkard is challenging 
a long-running tradition of philosophers, historians and Hegelian 
interpreters who have considered Hegel’s philosophy of history 
the least appealing part of his work, or at times the quintessential 
illustration of all of its flaws.  
The book is presented as “a Hegelian commentary on Hegel’s 
work” (p.4): it offers both an account of Hegel’s systematic 
notion of historicity (chapters 1, 2 and 5) and a step-by-step 
reading of Hegel’s Lectures (chapters 3 and 4). Its reach though, 
is far larger; the vocabulary and the references in the book hint 
at several possible interactions of Hegel’s philosophy with neo-
pragmatism, contemporary philosophy of language and of 
action, which the author partly develops in the hefty notes 
section. 
It would be impossible to analyze the totality of the claims 
condensed in the book within the length of a review. Thus, I will 
concentrate on Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy of 
history, which is structured on three interconnected theses. I will 
first sketch out Pinkard’s argument and then I will present its 
development through the chapters of the book. I will finally try 
to highlight some difficulties, which in my opinion could be 
found in Pinkard’s reading.  
In the first place, Pinkard insists on the importance of binding 
Hegel’s consideration of history with the Science of Logic and 
the Phenomenology. This is in order to interpret the historical 
process as the most proper space where subjectivity could 
(eventually) meet its “final end” of “making sense of itself”, as it 
is exposed in the Logic.  
Secondly, Pinkard suggests that the narrative proposed by Hegel 
in his Lectures is a retrospective reconstruction of the 
development of the specific form in which the “final end” of 
subjectivity was declined in Hegel’s own shape of life, namely, 
of the ideal of freedom as a founding value of European 
modernity. This leads to a twofold outcome. On the one hand, it 
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unveils a more specific notion of history, understood as the 
genealogic tracing of the conditions of one’s present, in the light 
of its specific ideal of justice. On the other hand, it provides a 
“pattern” for other possible retrospective narratives made with 
references to other historical declinations of the ideal of justice 
in other shapes of life. It is on this exact point that, according to 
Pinkard, Hegel would have failed to meet the standard he 
himself set for the understanding of history, missing the 
“openness” it implied and only considering other cultures as the 
negative reversal of Europe’s narrative.  
Pinkard’s third thesis is that Hegel’s identification of freedom as 
the founding value of European modernity is indeed right. 
Improved specification of the notion of freedom through the 
contradictions it engenders is still the driving force of the 
development of the, now more and more globalized, European 
shape of life.  
In the first chapter, Pinkard offers a distinct reading of the 
concluding category of the Logic, “Idea”, with relation to 
Hegel’s theory of recognition, reworking the interpretation of 
Hegel’s account of human subjectivity presented in Hegel’s 
Naturalism: Mind, Nature and the Final Ends of Life. 
Presupposing an “anti-processual” reading of the entire Science 
of Logic (p.3) as consisting of “three different kinds of logical 
structure” (p.13), Pinkard claims that the Doctrine of the 
Concept presents the structure of “human mindedness” as 
“apperceptive”. Therefore the logical “Idea” provides the formal 
structure of the highest possible form of (human) intelligibility, 
corresponding to self-consciousness.  
 Human rationality is “apperceptive” (p.11) insofar as it entails 
awareness of one’s standing as the immediate counterpart of 
awareness of objects. In this species-specific human feature is 
the very source of the space of reasons, or the “normative”, 
“noumenal” understanding of the world, which first appears in 
opposition to the world’s “phenomenal” image.  
The logical “Idea” provides the structure of self-consciousness 
as that structure, which makes this twofold split intelligible and 
grounded in the unity of human subjectivity.  
Pinkard combines his interpretation of the Logic’s “Idea” from 
Hegel’s Naturalism, with his “classic” reading of the “Idea” as 
also presenting the defining role of the “space of reasons” in the 
rational activity of sense-making (as in “The Logic of Hegel’s 
Logic”).   
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It is namely the reference to the space of reasons in the structure 
of the Logic’s “Idea” that forbids the full formalization of 
human rationality in a “scheme” (the Logic) abstract from its 
“embodiment” (human rational life), which is where the space of 
reasons is only actual. This is Pinkard’s reading of the Hegelian 
claim that “the universal particularizes itself” (p.18): the 
structure of the Logic’s “Idea” contains a placeholder, an empty 
space, for something which is better visible at the level of the 
Phenomenology.  
The fundamental structure of human subjectivity shall be 
explained more fully within the framework of recognition, 
where self-consciousness is seen as entailing the mediation with 
the space of reasons of a concrete shape of life, in which human 
subjects are immersed. 
In recognition, the completion of self-consciousness is described 
as the acknowledgement of the subject’s “dyadic” nature (p.25), 
that is, of its standing only provided another subject’s validation, 
as figuratively pictured in the servant’s position within the 
master-servant dialectic.  
The awareness of this mediated unity as constitutive of human 
subjectivity and of all possible roles within an inter-subjective 
setting is the condition for envisaging what Pinkard calls 
“eternal justice” (p.29). That of “eternal justice” is an ideal, 
which becomes visible only to those human consciousnesses that 
have become aware of their “dyadic” nature through 
recognition. The ideal of “eternal justice” consists in the aim of 
producing awareness of the dyadic structure of human 
subjectivity in all subjects within a given shape of life, and 
therefore to build an institutional order in which all members are 
dyadically defined, and equally considered (p.45).  
Through the ideal of “eternal justice” the task for self-
understanding defining human subjectivity achieves a properly 
historical dimension. The ideal of “eternal justice” “transcends” 
a shape of life’s manifestation in time, and becomes an aim 
towards which, though not at all in a linear progressive way, 
human history is moving.  
Therefore, even though it might very seldom be realized, 
“eternal justice” is the “infinite end” up to which progress in 
history could be measured (pp.29, 46).  
The second chapter is dedicated to the definition of the notion of 
“infinite end”, which is applied to the ideal of “eternal justice”.  
What defines an end as “infinite” is the impossibility of its 
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exhaustion in a finite gesture, even though this does not imply 
that such ends can never be realized. On the contrary, infinite 
ends are ends that are performed in their constant enactment, 
like the end of happiness or that of justice (p.41).  
The “infinite end” specific of history is the realization of 
“eternal justice”, which would be what Hegel meant by 
“reconciliation” (p.43). 
Pinkard argues that Hegel identifies the (universal) notion of 
“reconciliation” with the (particular) end of freedom, but misses 
the distinction between the (universal) logic of history as 
realization of the infinite end of “eternal justice”, and the 
(specific) genealogic necessity, which characterizes the history 
of modern Europe with reference to its particularized infinite 
end of “freedom”.  
Chapters 3 and 4 offer an exposition of Hegel’s historical 
narrative, adding a careful reconstruction of prejudices and 
illusions at work in Hegel’s account, providing them with 
historical context and yet not justification. Hegel’s orientalism is 
seen as determining the depiction of China and Persia as 
caricatures of the weaknesses of Europeans, and the presentation 
of India as a “world of fantasy” which could not make sense of 
itself. Hegel’s classicism is detected at the root of his 
identification of Greece as the (true) beginning of history, as 
well as for his identification of freedom as the “final end” of 
history as a whole. Finally, the myth of the Germanen, as the 
aboriginal people of modern Europe is deconstructed as the 
biggest ingenuousness in Hegel’s narrative.  
In Chapter 5 the book’s main theses are recollected, with a 
special focus on the redetermination of Hegel’s claim for 
necessity in history, as well as on the viability of Hegel’s 
historical narrative of European modernity. 
Does History Make Sense? is a book of historical and 
philosophical relevance. It competently draws attention to an 
almost ‘taboo’ topic in contemporary Hegelian research and it 
confronts the pivot of criticism against neo-pragmatist Hegelian 
interpretations, which are often said to be unable to make sense 
of Geist’s historical development, despite the fact that the latter 
is the core presupposition of their deflationary interpretation of 
Spirit (see Robert Stern in “Why Hegel Now (Again) and in 
What Form?”).  
It would not make sense to formulate “exegetical” remarks on a 
book openly devoted to saving the “Hegelian spirit” without 
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succumbing to the “Hegelian letter”. Still, Pinkard’s assessment 
of Hegel’s philosophy of history is dependent on a distinct 
interpretation of the Science of Logic and on a peculiar 
methodology, which, while having other authoritative advocates 
(such as Robert Pippin), could be considered problematic. While 
Pinkard’s reading of the Logic identifies the subjectivity thereby 
discussed with human subjectivity and the structure of self-
consciousness, his methodology does not reckon with the 
preliminary character of the Phenomenology, using it to clarify 
systematic aspects. Taken independently of their adherence to 
the “Hegelian letter”, I think that these aspects are responsible 
for some tensions in Pinkard’s own interpretation. Namely, 
Pinkard’s understanding of reconciliation with reference to the 
Phenomenology is elusive on how exactly the “split” preceding 
reconciliation and the decadence of a reconciled form are 
produced, making his account of historical movement as a whole 
uncertain. 
Furthermore, in the commendable effort of avoiding classic 
criticism of Hegel’s philosophy of history as an exclusionary 
tale (p.1), Pinkard offers an assessment of it as a retrospective 
genealogy, dependent on one’s cultural and present ideal of 
justice. Even though this encourages some form of “pluralism”, 
it engenders a mass of “narratives”, which are by definition 
separated one from the other. How far this separation can go is 
unclear if we accept Pinkard’s blurring of the line between the 
“constitutive” and the “normative” elements of the “Idea” (p.18) 
with reference to the primacy of recognition over the Logic. 
Further, the specific ideal of freedom and the general one of 
reconciliation do not appear as different as Pinkard would like 
them to be, when their respective definitions in the book are 
confronted. In addition to this, even though it is the possibility 
of other ideals of justice what should have relativized the 
western ideal of “freedom”, Pinkard seems unable to name one 
example of these other ideals. This might lead to the suspicion 
that Pinkard’s suggested “openness” of Hegel’s conception of 
history might fail its aim of liberating Hegel’s view from the 
charge of Eurocentrism. It would instead result in the flipside of 
the “totalizing” Western ideal of freedom, which has been 
criticized in deconstructionist readings such as Derrida’s (see 
Rorty, Richard “Rationality and Cultural Difference”).  
Finally, it is unclear if any form of objectivity in history could 
be claimed on Pinkard’s account of history as a retrospective 
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genealogy of specific “ideals of justice”. This is a problem, 
which was explored by historiographical research on the role of 
collective memory and which, according to Angelica Nuzzo, 
Hegel had in his phenomenological conception of history. 
However, he overcame it in his later theory of historicity, where 
this is understood as a process of transformation, ruled by the 
logical structures of judgment and contradiction, rather than by 
“phenomenological” justice. By doing so, Hegel avoided the 
perspectivism of self-consciousness, which still characterized 
his conception of history in the Phenomenology (see History, 
Memory and Justice in Hegel, not referenced by Pinkard). This 
reading would provide a convincing structure for the historical 
movement as a whole, with reference to scission and 
reconciliation, would advocate for some form of objectivity in 
historical narrative, and would allow for a different assessment 
of Hegel’s notion of freedom with relation to history, making it 
a systematic concept, therefore distinct from its culturally-
defined, “liberal” and “European” counterpart. 
All this seem yet to come at the cost of adopting a “processual” 
reading of Hegel’s philosophy, which Pinkard rejects (p.3).  
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